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Abstract 
 
Many travel websites recommend that consumers clear their cookies before buying an airline ticket in order to get 
better prices. Today the idea that browser cookies might influence the price of an airline ticket is widespread. 
Charging different prices to different consumers for the same product where those differences in price do not reflect 
differences in cost is called price discrimination. Internet technology has made it possible for airlines to price 
discriminate between their consumers using browser cookies. But do they really charge different prices to 
consumers with cookies on their computers showing that they have already visited the website? Or is it an urban 
myth? The aim of this study is to find evidence on the domestic U.S. airline market. Prices were collected on 41 
routes flown by three of the leading U.S. airlines:  American Airlines, Delta Air Lines, and United Air Lines. 
Results suggest that browser cookies do not affect online airline ticket prices. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Many travel websites recommend that consumers clear their cookies before buying an airline ticket in order to get 
better prices. For example, on Budgettravel.com, O’Neill states that, “Travel sites […] have used [cookies] to avoid 
showing you the same price every time you visit. Delete your cookies and they'll treat you like a new customer.”
16
 
Wikihow.com advises to “Clear out your cache and cookies in between airline searches, especially on different days 
or weeks. Otherwise, old prices will sometimes display in lieu of new ones, and you may miss out on the best 
price.”
11
 On Gadling.com, Blasko mentions that “To make sure you're getting the best prices when you book air 
travel online, be sure to clear your web browser's cookies and cache. This will make it appear as if it's your first time 
visiting these sites, and you're likely to see much better prices for your next flight!”
4
 The idea that browser cookies 
might influence the price of an airline ticket bought online is widespread. In theory it is possible for airlines to use 
browser cookies to price discriminate. But do airlines really do it? Or is it an urban myth? 
   In theory browser cookies could be used by airlines to price discriminate for two reasons. First, the airline industry 
has a market structure favorable to price discrimination.
9
 Second, airlines have already shown an eagerness to price 
discriminate using many other strategies.
5,18,20
  We would therefore expect airlines to consider new strategies to price 
discriminate. The research aims to find evidence that browser cookies influence ticket prices on domestic U.S. 
flights. This paper is divided into five sections. The first discusses price discrimination theory and price 
discrimination in the airline industry. The second explains how Internet technology can be used to facilitate price 
discrimination. The third provides background information on browser cookies in order to better understand how 
they can be used by firms. The fourth section describes the method used to test the hypothesis and the last presents 
and discusses the results. 
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2. The Airline Industry: a Favorable Market for Price Discrimination 
 
Price discrimination is one of the most common pricing strategies used by firms to maximize profit.
22
 It is defined as 
the practice of charging different prices to different consumers for the same product where those differences in price 
do not reflect differences in cost. It is well known that most passengers on individual flights buy their tickets at 
different prices.
20
 According to Helve, the high level of price dispersion in ticket prices is the result of price 
discrimination, uncertain demand, and high fixed cost.
10
 The importance of each of those three components 
explaining price dispersion is uncertain; but he notes that price discrimination appears to play the greatest role.
10
  
 
2.1. Airlines Meet The Three Conditions Needed To Price Discriminate 
 
Three conditions must be met for firms to practice price discrimination.
22
 The first is that firms must have market 
power, that is, they must be price setters.
22
 A firm has market power when it doesn’t have to worry about other firms 
charging lower prices if it decides to charge higher prices. In a competitive market we expect every firm to charge 
the same price, such that price equals marginal cost.
9
 It implies that price discrimination requires a non-competitive 
market since firms have no market power and are price takers in competitive markets.
9
 Steen and Sørgard note that 
“In the airline industry we do not observe price equal to marginal cost.”
20
 Therefore, airlines are price setters. 
   The second condition is that firms must be able to prevent low-price consumers from reselling to higher-price 
consumers.
22
 If a firm cannot prevent low-price consumers from reselling to higher-price consumers, we would 
eventually expect low-price consumers to engage in arbitrage.  They would resell their tickets at prices slightly 
higher than what they paid but still undercutting airline prices charged to higher- price consumers. Airlines are able 
to prevent resell by selling non transferrable tickets that include the traveler’s name and ID. 
   The third condition is that firms must be able to separate consumers according to their willingness to pay.
22
 The 
ultimate objective of price discrimination is to maximize profit by charging consumers a price as close as possible to 
the maximum price they would be willing to pay. The airline industry is often used as an example of ways firms can 
differentiate between consumers with different willingness to pay. For instance, airlines can differentiate between 
two types of travelers with different price-elasticity of demand: business and leisure travelers.
9
 Demand elasticity is 
a measure of the consumer’s responsiveness to changes in price. Higher prices can be charged to consumers with 
lower price-elasticity of demand since an increase in price is less likely to influence their willingness to buy. 
According to Gaggero and Piga, because business travelers are on tighter schedule and find it difficult to substitute 
travel time and mode of transportation, their demand is less price elastic than leisure travelers.
8
 Airlines can 
differentiate between business and leisure travelers according to destinations (business versus vacation cities), ticket 
restrictions (refundable and flexible; economic, business, and first class), number of days the tickets are purchased 
before departure, whether or not the trip includes a Saturday night stay-over, and holiday periods.
5,18,20
   
 
2.2. A Detailed Look At Price Discrimination Strategies Used By Airlines 
 
Since the airline industry satisfies the three conditions needed to price discriminate, we can give a closer look at 
some of the strategies used by airlines. There are three types of price discrimination: personal, product, and group 
discrimination.  
 
2.2.1    personal – or first degree  
 
Price discrimination is when sellers charge a different price for each unit, based on each consumer’s willingness to 
pay.
20
 Because it is difficult to estimate each consumer’s willingness to pay, personal discrimination is the most 
complicated type to practice and therefore the least common. However, Internet technology has the potential to 
facilitate personal price discrimination through means like the use of cookies.
21
  
 
2.2.2    product – or second degree  
 
Price discrimination differs from personal and group discrimination as the differentiation intends to separate 
products, not consumers.
14
 Consumers separate themselves as a result of the differentiation of the products. Product 
discrimination is practiced by airlines all the time. One of the most common strategies is versioning. It consists of 
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offering different versions of a ticket for the same flight by putting restrictions on tickets.
20
 Consumers often have 
the option to get a refundable and/or flexible ticket and they can also choose between economy, business or first-
class. Airlines charge a lower price for tickets with the most restrictions. Another commonly used strategy in this 
industry is inter-temporal price discrimination (IPD). According to Bergantino and Capozza, IPD consists of 
charging different fares to different consumers according to the number of days a ticket is purchased before 
departure.
3
 In their study on IPD, Bergantino and Capozza found that prices are changing according to the J-curve 
effect: early-bookers pay moderately higher prices compared to middle-bookers, whereas late-bookers pay the 
highest fares.
3
 Furthermore, airlines also discriminate depending on the day of the week. Puller and Taylor call it 
day-of-week price discrimination.
18
 They found that fares were 5% lower on the weekend than on the other days of 
the week.
18
 While versioning intend to sort consumers according to their general willingness to pay, inter-temporal 
and day-of-the-week price discrimination are strategies used to separate business and leisure consumers based on 
their search behavior.  
 
2.2.3    group – or third degree  
 
Price discrimination is when a firm can differentiate between groups of buyers and take advantage of their different 
willingness to pay by charging different prices.
14
 According to Steen and Sørgard, discount to large consumers and 
frequent flyer programs are two common practices of group discrimination in the airline industry.
20
  An example of 
discount to large consumers is when firms have a contract with airlines so that the firms’ employees get lower price 
rates on their tickets.
19
 Frequent flyer programs are habitual in the airline industry. Members of those programs can 
earn points that lead them to get a free baggage waiver or often a free ticket.
20
  
 
 
3. Internet Technology to Facilitate Personal Price Discrimination 
 
Recent Internet developments have generated new opportunities for firms to price discriminate.
15
 As mentioned 
earlier, personal price discrimination is the hardest for a firm to achieve since it requires personal information from 
consumers. Ulph and Vulkan explain that consumer-specific information is usually complicated and expensive to 
get.
21
 However, the development of e-commerce has made it easier in recent years and firms have been taking 
advantage of it. According to Ulph and Vulkan, “an enormous amount of consumer-specific data has been collected 
by retailers and marketing companies.”
21
 The Internet now offers a means for firms to collect consumer-specific data 
and therefore facilitate personal price discrimination. By gaining private information, firms may be able to estimate 
more accurately each consumer’s willingness to pay. In turn, they can individually customize their website pages 
and online catalogues.
21
 In other words, firms can offer products that consumers want at prices that they are willing 
to pay. 
    According to Koch and Cebula, browser cookies are the easiest way for firms to legally obtain information about 
consumers.
13
 Cookies provide information about users’ activity on specific websites.
6
 Although consumer-specific 
information can be collected via other means, such as intelligent agents for data mining, this paper will focus on 
browser cookies since the goal of the study is to find evidence that airlines use cookies to charge different prices to 
different consumers for the same ticket.  
  Although travel websites state that consumers will be charged higher prices if they don’t clear their cookies before 
buying an airline ticket online, it could be equally true that they charge lower prices. While numerous visits show 
that a consumer is interested in a flight or in traveling at a specific date, it might also indicate that a consumer has a 
very price-elastic demand and is looking for the best prices. On one hand, considering consumers’ high interest in 
the flight, the economic theory would suggest that a higher price should be charged since consumers are more likely 
to buy it. On the other hand, considering consumers’ high price elasticity of demand, a lower price should be 
charged. Although the study was motivated by the statement made by travel websites that higher prices are charged, 
it is equally interesting to investigate whether airlines use cookies to price discriminate in the interest or against 
consumers. 
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4. Browser Cookies as a Means for Personal Price Discrimination 
 
In order to understand how browser cookies could be used by airlines to price discriminate their consumers, it is first 
necessary to understand what cookies are, how they work, and what they are used for. According to Marshall Brain, 
holder of a Master’s degree in computer science from NC State University, a cookie is a piece of text that a web 
server can store on a user's hard disk.
6
 Cookies allow a website to store information on a user's machine and later 
retrieve it. Brain further explains that, although there is no limit to the amount of information stored by a website, 
most of them will simply store a user ID number.
6
 
   When you type the web address (URL) of a website, your browser does two things: it sends a request for the 
website page and it looks into your machine to find a cookie file from this website. Assuming that the website uses 
cookies, your hard disk will contain a cookie file if you have already visited the website. Once the file is found, your 
browser will send the information contained in this file to the server along with the page request. However, if you 
visit the website for the first time, no cookie file will be found. Thus, only the page request is sent to the server. For 
websites using cookies, although no information is sent, it still indicates that you have never visited the website 
before. A new cookie file is then created with a new ID and any information that the website would like to store. 
Brain explains that once on your computer, cookies don’t do very much.
6
 In fact, a website can only use information 
that it stored itself: the information stored by other websites is inaccessible.
6
  
   Even though users do not directly see this process happening, they have some control over it. On computers, users 
can select an option in order to choose to accept or deny cookies every time they are sent. Cookies can also be 
removed from a computer at any time. Those two options were used in this research in order to gather prices both 
from a computer collecting cookies and from a computer without cookies. 
   Brain provides three major reasons why browser cookies are used by firms.
6
 First, it allows them to accurately 
determining how many readers visit the site and whether those visitors are new or repeated.
6
 Second, firms can store 
user preferences and customize their site differently for each visitor.
6
 Third, e-commerce firms can use options to 
make shopping online more convenient for the visitors by remembering what had been in their cart and what they 
bought.
6
 Thus, cookies can potentially benefit both consumers and firms. The reason why cookies make targeting 
much more precise for firms is that the site can track not only your purchases, but also the pages that you read, the 
ads you click on, etc.
6
  
   By providing information about how many times a visitor has been an airline website and has checked prices for 
specific flights, cookies might be used to estimate visitors’ willingness to pay. As mentioned earlier, airlines 
separate between business and leisure travelers to price discriminate on the basis of their different price-elasticity of 
demand. We expect travelers with higher price elasticity of demand to visit airline websites more often. For 
instance, we expect business travelers to buy their ticket after visiting the website no more than two or three times. 
The main reason is that they have very few substitutes due to their lack of flexibility and therefore they don’t need to 
compare prices. On the other hand, leisure travelers usually have a more price-elastic demand because their time 
schedule is more flexible and they are more open to explore different destinations.
8
 It is more likely that leisure 
travelers will check a greater number of prices for different dates and destinations before buying their ticket. Such 
comparisons are likely to require several visits on a same airline website for similar flights. Furthermore, most 
travelers are aware of the high fluctuation of airline ticket prices.
20
 It is then reasonable to think that travelers with 
high price elasticity of demand are more likely to visit airline websites more regularly in order to try to get the best 
prices. The number of visit on an airline website can therefore be an indicator of a consumer’s price elasticity of 
demand. 
 
 
5. Methodology 
 
The empirical strategy is to create a data set of airline ticket prices. The data collection period took place from 
January 27, 2014 to March 19, 2014. I gathered prices every day for the first three weeks, and, then, every five days 
until the day of departure. I collected prices quoted on the official websites of three of the leading U.S. airlines: 
American Airlines, Delta Air Lines, and United Air Lines.
7
 For the 41 routes making up the sample, I collected 
prices from two different computers: my own computer and one of the public computers at the University of North 
Carolina Asheville. On my computer, I cleared cookies on the first day, before starting the data collection. Then, I 
set my computer so that it would collect cookies and I checked that all three airline websites were leaving cookies 
after each visit. This means that the Airlines could tell that I visited the website before and that I have been looking 
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at the same flights several times. On the UNC Asheville public computer, I cleared cookies before looking at the 
price of each ticket, between each search. In this case, I appeared as a new consumer every time I visited the 
website. We can therefore expect prices on the two computers to be different if the airlines use cookies to price 
discriminate. 
  I used a sample from of a set of city pairs that had been used in previous studies on airline industry pricing. 
Specifically, the set of city pairs that had been used by Puller, Sengupta, and Wiggins in “Testing Theories of 
Scarcity Pricing in the Airline Industry,” as well as by Puller and Taylor in “Price Discrimination by Day-of-Week 
of Purchase: Evidence from the U.S. Airline Industry.”
17,18
 There are two main reasons why I used a sample from 
this specific set. First, Puller and Taylor found that price discrimination was practiced on these routes.
18
 As we are 
looking for evidence of price discrimination, it is important to know that airlines have the ability to price 
discriminate on the routes composing the sample. The second reason is that the categorization of “mixed” versus 
“leisure” routes done by Puller and Taylor was beneficial.
18
 We expect price discrimination to be more feasible on 
“mixed” routes for reasons that will be explained below. The main difference between the two previous studies and 
this one is that they both used data from a census to get the actual price paid, while I initiated ticket purchases to get 
price quotes.
18
  
  The original set of city pairs is made up of 85 routes representing a stratified sample of the largest routes for six of 
the U.S. largest carriers: American, Delta, United, Continental, Northwest, and US Airways.
18
 In this case, a 
stratified sample means that it includes flights from varied market structures: level of competition, demand, type of 
travelers, etc.
18
 My analysis is restricted to the 41 flights served by three of these carriers: American (14 flights), 
Delta (13 flights), and United (14 flights).
1
 A list of the routes is shown in Table 1 on page 6. All 41 routes are round 
trip and have non-stop flights with departure on the morning (between 8 a.m. and 10 a.m.) and return late afternoon 
(between 4p.m. and 6 p.m.). For routes that did not offer flights during those time slots, I picked the flight with the 
time closest to that slot. When more than one flight was offered in the time slot, I randomly picked one, disregarding 
if it was the most or least expensive. Using this method, the sample included some of the most expensive and some 
of the least expensive tickets offered on a given day. Once I chose the flights for each route on the first day, I only 
collected prices for those particular flights during the entire collection period.  
   I collected prices for tickets with the most restrictions: non-refundable and non-flexible tickets in economic class. 
In some cases, only refundable tickets or first class tickets were available; I would then use the price of those tickets. 
Furthermore, toward the end of the collection period, as it became closer to the departure day, a few of the flights 
sampled no longer had seat available. In this case, no price was collected. Although choosing tickets with the most 
restrictions might have affected the results by already separating consumers according to their willingness pay, 
Puller and Taylor found evidence of day-of-the-week price discrimination among the most restricted tickets.
18
 Thus, 
a previous study showed that price discrimination had been practiced on the sample of tickets used in this research. 
   All 41 routes have a departure flight of March 20, 2014, and a return flight of March 23, 2014. Since the ability to 
separate between consumers with different price elasticities of demand is the key to price discrimination in the 
airline industry, dates were chosen so that flight attendance would be likely to have a good mix of both business and 
leisure travelers. First, a four-day trip can be for business as well as for leisure purposes. Second, most students have 
a week off for spring break in March. Depending on the schools, Spring break 2014 was between February 16
th
 and 
April 17
th
.
12 
We can therefore expect some students and families with students to travel from March 20
th
 to March 
23
rd
.  
   Using the categorization done by Puller and Taylor, each route is defined as a “leisure” or “mixed” route.
18
 A 
“leisure” route is a route for which most travelers are likely to be leisure travelers.
18
 A “mixed” route is a route for 
which travelers are likely to be both leisure and business travelers.
18
 We expect price discrimination to be practiced 
on “mixed” routes more than “leisure” routes, since they provide a greater mix with consumers with different price 
elasticity of demand. 
      Puller and Taylor used two methods to classify routes as “leisure” and “mixed.”
18
 The first method uses a 
tourism index which equals the ratio of 2004 accommodations income to total personal income for the Metropolitan 
Area of the destination airport.
18
 The second method uses the business travel index of domestic airline travel created 
by Borenstein in 2010.
18
 A route is classified as “leisure” if it either has a tourism index above the 80
th
 percentile or 
a business index below the 20
th
 percentile of the routes from the original set used in the studies done by Taylor and 
Puller, and Puller, Sengupta, and Wiggins.
18
 The “leisure” routes in the present study are the ones with the following 
destinations: Denver, Fort Lauderdale, Las Vegas, Miami, Orlando, Phoenix, San Diego, Seattle, and Tampa. The 
other routes are classified as “mixed.” This means that eight of the 41 routes are characterized as “leisure” routes, 
and 31 are characterized as “mixed” routes. 
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Table 1. Routes included in the analysis by origin and destination city (airport code) 
  
American Airlines 
Las Vegas (LAS) - Dallas-Ft Worth (DFW) 
Los Angeles Intl (LAX) - Dallas-Ft Worth (DFW) 
Los Angeles (LAX) – New York-JFK (JFK) 
Chicago-O'Hare (ORD) – New York-La Guardia (LGA) 
St. Louis (STL) – Dallas-Ft Worth (DFW) 
Phoenix (PHX) – Dallas-Ft Worth (DFW) 
Los Angeles Intl (LAX) – Chicago-O'Hare (ORD) 
Dallas-Ft Worth (DFW) – Denver (DEN) 
Dallas-Ft Worth (DFW) – Orange County (SNA) 
Chicago-O'Hare (ORD) – Dallas-Ft Worth (DFW) 
New York-La Guardia (LGA) – Miami (MIA) 
Chicago-O'Hare (ORD) – St. Louis (STL) 
Dallas-Ft Worth (DFW) – Orlando (MCO) 
Miami (MIA) – New York-JFK (JFK) 
Delta Air Lines 
Dallas-Ft Worth (DFW) – Atlanta (ATL) 
Orlando (MCO) – Atlanta (ATL) 
Los Angeles Intl (LAX) – Atlanta (ATL) 
Los Angeles (LAS) – Atlanta (ATL) 
New York-La Guardia (LGA) – Atlanta (ATL)  
Cincinnati (CVG) – Atlanta (ATL) 
Atlanta (ATL) – Miami (MIA) 
Tampa (TPA) – Atlanta (ATL) 
Cincinnati (CVG) – New York-La Guardia (LGA) 
Atlanta (ATL) – Philadelphia (PHL) 
Atlanta (ATL) –  Fort Lauderdale (FLL) 
Newark (EWR) – Atlanta (ATL) 
Boston (BOS) - Atlanta (ATL) 
United Air Lines 
Los Angeles Intl (LAX) – Denver (DEN) 
Los Angeles Intl (LAX) – Chicago-O'Hare (ORD) 
San Francisco (SFO) – San Diego (SAN) 
Los Angeles (LAS) – Chicago-O'Hare (ORD) 
Denver (DEN) – Chicago-O'Hare (ORD)  
Washington-Dulles (IAD) – San Francisco (SFO) 
Washington-Dulles (IAD) - Chicago-O'Hare (ORD) 
Chicago-O'Hare (ORD) – San Francisco (SFO) 
Los Angeles (LAS) – Denver (DEN) 
San Francisco (SFO) – Los Angeles Intl (LAX) 
Ontario (ONT) – Denver (DEN)  
Seattle (SEA) – Chicago (ORD) 
Chicago-O'Hare (ORD) – New York-La Guardia 
(LGA) 
Portland (PDX) – San Francisco (SFO) 
 
 
6. Results and Discussion 
 
The sample tested in this study did not provide any evidence that American Airlines, Delta Air Lines, or United Air 
Lines, practice price discrimination based on browser cookies. In fact, results strongly suggest that airlines do not 
use cookies to price discriminate. Table 2 reproduces a very small sample of the data set
2
 (6 prices among 2,296 
collected). It is a representative sample for every set of prices (price from a computer with cookies and without 
cookie) collected for every airline on every route. The table presents the prices collected on three routes on a 
different day, each by a different airline. Note that in the data set, for each route on a given day, the price quoted on 
the computer with cookies was always the same as the price on the computer without cookie. 
 
Table 2. Sample of the data set 
Date Airline Route Flight number 
(Departure-Return) 
Price with 
cookies 
Price without 
cookie 
2/1/2014 American Airlines LAS – DFW 1499 - 1067 $332 $332 
2/16/2014 Delta Air Lines LAX – ATL 80 - 1076 $680 $680 
3/7/2014 United Air Lines ORD – SFO 761 - 1736 $706 $706 
 
   Although the sample tested didn’t provide any evidence, it is possible that price discrimination based on cookies is 
used in other cases. For example, future research could repeat the method used in this study to test different samples: 
other city pairs, other airlines, other dates, and other type of tickets – different ticket restrictions – could be used. 
More specifically, it would interesting to look at statistics providing information about when business and leisure 
travelers are more likely to fly and pick a date with a high attendance of both types of travelers. Finding statistics 
showing when business and leisure travelers usually book their tickets might be used to figure out a good time to 
collect data. Price discrimination would be more likely to be practiced during a time when both business and leisure 
travelers book tickets.  
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   In addition to look at different samples, a similar method could also be considered to test whether cookies are used 
to price discriminate by online travel agencies such as Kayak, Skyscanner or Expedia. Such websites are convenient 
for consumers since they can easily compare prices between different airlines. However, in the article “Cheapest 
Airfares Might Be on Airlines' Own Websites” from the Associated Press published on DailyFinance website, it is 
mentioned that airlines might be charging lower prices than online travel agencies.
1 
Since they may charge different 
prices, even though airlines might not be using cookies to discriminate, travel agencies may do so. 
   Although this study focused on browser cookies since travel websites assert that they influence online ticket 
prices, it was mentioned earlier that specific intelligent agents for data mining also provide consumer-specific 
information.
21
 Ulph and Vulkan state that most consumer-specific information is actually collected through those 
agents.
21
 Intelligent agents for data mining are programs that can estimate buyer preferences, valuations and product 
tastes by combining consumer purchase histories with individual and site demographics.
2
 It would be interesting to 
expand this research by testing whether airlines use personal price discrimination based this type of intelligent 
agents.  
   Finally, a more theoretical direction for future research could be to investigate personal price discrimination theory 
on e-commerce in general, not just in the airline industry. It is known that cookies and intelligent agents are 
frequently used to personalized websites,
19
 but it would be interesting to explore how the different market structures 
of e-commerce influence the use of Internet technology to practice personal price discrimination. For instance, it 
might be the case that airlines are not using cookies to price discriminate because it is not a profitable pricing 
strategy in this market. Future research could focus on personal price discrimination theory on e-commerce and aim 
at describing conditions and market structures for which such pricing strategy is likely to be favorable. 
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9. Endnotes 
                                                          
1
 Although my sample is restricted to three of the six airlines, we still expect to have a stratified sample since it includes all 
flights for each of the three airlines. 
2
 Full data set available on request. 
